Economics and incentives are a critical part of the design of modern layer-1 blockchain protocols such as Ethereum. For example, scarce resources like blockspace require careful pricing. Block rewards, transaction fees, and maximal extracted value (MEV) must be shared across the stakeholders in the system, and participants must be incentivized appropriately. Subtle game theory governs the interactions between block builders, block proposers, and end users. Many of these economic and game-theoretic challenges are specific to the blockchain application domain, necessitating new models, new mechanisms, and new analysis frameworks.
This two-day workshop will bring together practitioners, researchers, and academics to discuss challenges, recent progress, and opportunities in the economics of blockchain protocols. The workshop will consist of invited keynote presentations, contributed talks, and panel discussions. Specific topics of focus will include, for example, proposer-builder separation, MEV, layer 1 security rehypothecation/restaking, and roll-ups.
Date: December 6-7, 2023
Location: The Forum at Columbia University, 605 W 125th St, New York, NY 10027
Hosts: Briger Family Digital Finance Lab at Columbia Business School; School of Engineering and Applied Science at Columbia University; Ethereum Foundation
Organizers:
- Davide Crapis (Ethereum Foundation)
- Justin Drake (Ethereum Foundation)
- Ciamac Moallemi (Columbia)
- Barnabé Monnot (Ethereum Foundation)
- Mike Neuder (Ethereum Foundation)
- Tim Roughgarden (Columbia / a16z crypto)
- Danny Ryan (Ethereum Foundation)
GOAL: to improve the economics and incentives in permissionless blockchain protocols
FORMAT: a mix of short presentations, panel discussions, and interactive breakout sessions
